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FEDERALIST SOCIETY 2007 NATIONAL
LAWYERS CONVENTION
Litigation & Professional Responsibility: Is
Overlawyering Overtaking Democracy?
DAVID M. SCHIZER* (MODERATOR)
Welcome everyone. We're going to get started. I'm David Schizer, the Dean of
Columbia Law School. I'm here to moderate the panel, and our panel's title is, of
course, "Is Overlawyering Overtaking Democracy?"
Now, as the moderator I get to ask questions, and I'm going to start with a
question of the audience. My question is, aside from me, how many people here
have seen Jerry Seinfeld's new animated movie, Bee Movie? I've a six-year-old
daughter, which explains why I did-okay, a couple of people. For the rest of the
audience's benefit, I should tell you the premise of the movie is that a bee-Jerry
Seinfeld-a bee brings a lawsuit against the humans to keep them from taking the
honey.
Quite amusingly, there are some unintended and very bad consequences of this
lawsuit. But there's a line in the movie that I wanted to share with you because the
bee has a co-counsel, and the co-counsel is a mosquito. And the mosquito in
asserting that he is in fact a lawyer says, "Well, I already was a bloodsucking
parasite, and all I needed was this briefcase." So, this taps into that popular
perception that our profession does some harm, as well as some good. And the
truth, as I'm sure we can all agree, about the good: Lawyers are obviously
essential, will work for liberty. We also are important in ensuring economic
growth. We police the separation of powers, enforce contracts.
I mean all that stuff is familiar, but I suspect that we would also agree that there
are aspects of our legal system that are unfortunate and that we would love to
change. I'll give one example that I heard about that certainly bothered me. One
of our graduates of Columbia has been defending securities class actions for
years, and he got a call from a very well-known plaintiffs' lawyer who said-I'm
making up the name-I wanted to ask you about the Jones complaint. My friend
says, well, the Jones complaint? I haven't seen that one yet. And he says, well, I
* Following is the transcript of a panel held on November 16, 2007 at the 2007 Annual National Lawyers
Convention. The panel was sponsored by the Litigation and Professional Responsibility Practice Groups of the
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies.
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think we should settle it, but the fact is I haven't written it yet. Anyway, it's not
really supposed to work that way. There are issues about strike suits, about the
high cost of litigation, about economic activity moving offshore because of the
litigation climate, and of course about overzealous regulation.
Now, if I formulated at this level of abstraction the fact that our system does
good things but that it has problems, I suspect that everyone in the room and
everyone on the panel might well agree with me. But once we look at specific
policy questions, specific issues, then obviously there's not going to be a
consensus, and I'm predicting a very lively panel because I think we have a
wonderfully gifted group and a range of views. So, the moderator's job is a very
easy one. What I get to do is introduce them to you, and they are a truly, truly
terrific panel.
I'm going to introduce them in alphabetical order because they're speaking in
alphabetical order. Our first panelist is Professor Theodore Eisenberg. Ted is one
of the leading academic experts on empirical analysis of law, and much of his
work is focused on various aspects of our litigation system, whether it's punitive
damages, victim impact evidence, capital juries, biases for and against litigants,
and the chances of success on appeal. Now, he studied these issues in different
contexts, contexts as variable as civil rights, bankruptcy and capital cases.
Ted is joined by his fellow panelist Walter Olson. Walter is a senior fellow at
the Manhattan Institute. He's written three books on the U.S. litigation system.
They're called The Litigation Explosion, The Excuse Factory, and The Rule of
Lawyers. He also runs a website that many of you may have seen, called
overlawyered.com, and it's actually one of the oldest blogs on law that's around.
Victor Schwartz is our next panelist. Victor is a partner in the DC office of
Shook, Hardy & Bacon. He chairs its public policy group, which integrates
litigation, government affairs and public relations. He's a leading expert on
product liability, and in fact he helped to draft the Uniform Product Liability Act
and the Risk Retention Act. He was the chairman of the federal Interagency Task
Force on Product Liability at the Department of Commerce, and he's also the
co-author of something academics like me know quite well, I think the most
widely used torts casebook, Prosser, Wade & Schwartz. Victor, by the way, is also
former dean of the University of Cincinnati College of Law, and I can't resist
telling you that he is also a Columbia Law School graduate.
This brings me, then, to our final panelist, who is also a Columbia Law School
graduate, David Vladeck, who is a professor at Georgetown Law Center. David is
a former director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, which is a well-known
public interest law firm. At Georgetown, he directs the Institute for Public
Representation, which is a clinical law program, and he is also the Director of
their Center on Health Regulation and Governance.
So, it is my pleasure to welcome our panelists. Please join me in welcoming
them.
Ted, let's start with you.
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THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
First, I'm not a graduate of Columbia Law School, but I have spoken there. So
maybe that's good enough-and I'm available for honorary degrees, should you
want to unify the panel in some way.
My talk is really about data, what I've come to see about the tort system
generally and the perceptions of overlawyering and what the data seem to show
about it, not in any particular case but in the aggregate, sort of at the level of
whether we need national or even very dramatic state reform. I want to mention
three results based on data having nothing to do with me necessarily, but they
come from three pretty respectable and diverse sources. One is the Rand Institute
for Civil Justice. They published an article in 2004 in a journal I edit, the Journal
of Empirical Legal Studies. They looked at a forty-year time series of data, which
was probably the longest time series of tort data we have in the United States.
These data are limited geographically. But what they found was no real increase
in awards over forty years.1
We put that next to the Bureau of Justice Statistics data for forty-five of
America's largest counties. They've been studying, since 1992, trials-jury trials
in particular-and have found really no increase in the amount of awards since
1992 with follow-up in 1996 and 2001, and they're continuing to work on it for
2005. These data should be available in 2008. Again, the median award in a tort
case is about $30,000, and that hasn't changed much over time.
We follow that up with the National Center for State Courts, which is the
leading clearinghouse of information about state courts. And what they've done,
which is very difficult, is to try and get some uniformity in the way in which
states report cases; just simple case counting, even like the number of tort cases
filed. And what the National Center data pretty consistently show over the last ten
or twenty years is absolutely no real increase in tort filings.
So we have no increase in filings, we have no increase in awards, and yet we
have, I think, consistent claims from the business community that the tort system
is out of control and that juries in particular are a threat to their businesses
because of the high variance in jury awards and the like. And over the years I've
sort of wondered, you know, our businesses are pretty smart. Do they really not
know what's going on? You know, it's perfectly respectable to lobby for tort
reform on the grounds that it will cost us less money, and why not? I want lower
taxes too. But in general, do they really not know what's going on, or do they just
want to get some advantage like the rest of us?
And so, I think I've begun to get some information that might help reconcile it,
and that's the burden of what I'm putting up on the screen today, and that's an
article by Jeff Miller at NYU Law School and me on how businesses actually
1. Seth A. Seabury, Nicholas M. Pace, & Robert T. Reville, Forty Years of Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STuD. 1 (2004).
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behave when they contract with each other.2 So, we looked at the Securities
Exchange Commission EDGAR database, searched, actually read the dispute
resolution clauses in 2,800 contracts, and we coded, I think, two key things. One
is, did they contract out of the legal system by opting for arbitration? And two is,
if they didn't contract out of the legal system by opting for arbitration, did they at
least mutually agree to avoid those high-risk, crazy juries? So, if a lot of the
rhetoric was true, I believe that one would predict that we would consistently see
businesses tend to opt out of the legal system altogether because they don't really
trust the judges either. Or two, opt out of at least in jury trials because those are
the particularly risky ones.
So, what you see up there is simply the larger project that we're reading
systematically, the dispute resolution clauses. The DePaul Law Review article
already published gives the result for attrition clauses. And what we found there,
to our surprise, was for these big, publicly held, sophisticated American
corporations, they ex ante contracted for arbitration exactly 11 percent of the
time. That is, 90 percent of their contracts did not ex ante agree to arbitration.
That's in sharp distinction to, perhaps if you look at your cell phone contract or
your credit card contract, where you'll probably find 100 percent requiring you to
arbitrate and avoid class sessions.3
Today's story is about perceptions of juries and what we find, and so you can
read down the list of perceptions: Juries aren't competent; they're unpredictable;
they are prone to give absurdly high rewards even in business against
business-you might remember Texaco Pennzoil's $11 billion award-so you
risk the company when you go before a jury. They considered extralegal factors,
and they're just expensive to begin with. So we should really be avoiding these.
So, we predicted that large, sophisticated businesses, when we could actually get
at their contracts, not the ex post litigation when we can actually get at their
contracts, would tend to show waivers of jury trial and clauses requiring
arbitration. The DePaul article addresses the arbitration issue.
We coded twelve categories of contracts on the data coming from the
Securities and Exchange Commission's 8-K filings. There are a lot of contracts
up there, so this is a six- or seven-months time slice in 2002. It would be nice to
do more, but with 2,800, I think we're getting a reasonable picture of what's
going on, although of course things could vary over time. You can't generalize
from particular time slices.
Here are the basic results. Perhaps the most important line is the bottom line. It
is the total at row the bottom, which suggests that of our 2,800 contracts, 19.9
2. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study ofEx Ante
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 335 (2007).
3. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MicH. J.L. REFoRM (forthcoming
2008).
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percent-that would be the second numerical column-waived jury trial. If you
count arbitration clauses as effective waivers of jury trial, then that's the second
pair of, the last pair of columns, then we would have a total of 29 percent of
contracts avoiding juries. I'm not sure it's correct to count arbitration clauses as
being particularly fearful of juries since they're also fleeing judges as well as
juries. But at least we have, I'd say the cleanest number is the 20 percent, but you
can make of it what you will when we throw in the arbitration clauses.
So, we try to explore the waiver pattern. I would refer you to the full article in
the journal to get all the details.4 But we tried to say, well, what explains the
pattern of waivers across cases, across the contracts? And I think it's important,
we're studying ex ante behavior of big, sophisticated parties not the ex post
litigation behavior when disputes have gone badly. So, we thought maybe
contract standardization might help explain it. That is, is the contract just a form
you mark up? You're the associate in the law firm; you're told, draft a new
contract. What do you ask for? Show me the last deal; I'll change the names. And
by not changing more I'll probably make a mistake, but at least I'll be doing what
the last guy did.
We looked at choice of forum clauses. We looked at international contract
status. Was a party to the contract a non-US entity? And we looked at several
other things. One is a measure of contract standardization, and simply-our
crude measure of standardization is the choice of law. And what you can see is
that in some categories of contracts-for example mergers, the second in from
the upper left-in some categories of contracts, New York law is completely
dominant. That's also the subject of another article we're doing.5 In pooling
service agreements, these sorts of fairly sophisticated financial things, New York
law dominates. In underwriting agreements, New York law dominates. In
security agreements, New York law dominates. And generally, the story of choice
of law for large public firms is New York.
It's interesting, large corporations tend to incorporate in Delaware, but the law
they tend to choose in about 50 percent of their contracts is New York law, and
we're trying to see whether that measure of standardization actually forecasts
particular clauses, such as rates of arbitration, embracement and rates of jury trial
waiver.
In this graph, on the left-hand side-standardization does help explain the
pattern of arbitration clauses. That is, in low-standardization contracts you see a
relatively high rate of arbitration clauses. In high-standardization contracts you
see a very low rate of arbitration clauses. That might have something to do with
4. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study of
Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539 (2007).
5. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law
and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDoZO L. REv. (forthcoming
2008).
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the theory of when arbitrators are most appropriate or not, but that's sort of
beyond the scope of today's talk. The pattern is less clear on the right side, which
deals with jury trial waivers. That is, we don't find contracts standardization as
measured by choice of law really doing a good job of helping to ascertain when
jury trials would be waived.
What we do find is-and there's really one line in here that is, I think, critical
although it's varied-we do find a very high correlation between whether a
contract specified a forum, and you might expect that all the time, but you don't
actually see it all the time in these contracts. We found a very high association
between whether a contract specified a forum, a choice of forum for litigation,
and whether there was a jury trial waiver. And it's the fourth row up from the
bottom labeled in the left-hand column "no forum specified." That actually
accounted for more than half the contracts. In 1,700 of the contracts, no forum
was specified, and in the overwhelming majority of those there was no jury trial
waiver. So, the contract that did not go to the detailed level of specifying a forum
also did not address jury trial waivers, and that may be some insight into what's
going on with the lawyers drafting the contracts, or their clients. One would think
with these large sophisticated firms, publicly held ones, that the clients actually
have input. It's not just a sort of lawyer driving the system, but one can't be sure.
We tried to see whether things varied by the presence of a non-U.S. party. That
is, non-U.S. parties might be particularly fearful of American juries and might
bargain even harder to waive jury trials. But we didn't find any significant effect
or any significant effect whatsoever when we had domestic parties, pure domestic
parties and then also international parties as also some part of the contract. We
found jury trial waiver in about 20 percent. I should add, with arbitration clauses
we did find a difference. We found arbitration clauses present in about 20 percent
of the contracts when there was a non-U.S. party, compared to about 10 percent
when there was a U.S. party.
This next slide is simply an effort-some of you may be familiar with the
Chamber of Commerce annual ranking of legal systems, and we're trying to get a
handle on whether that perception helped drive the rate of jury trial waivers.
There's a modest association, not terribly strong, and one has to be suspicious
about these sorts of state-level aggregated data sets. But at least the Chamber
supplied something about the business community's perceptions that we could
test with their behavior with respect to jury trials. So, the X-axis is the Chamber
of Commerce rank of the fairness of the jury system in the state, and the Y-axis is
the waiver clause rate, jury trial waiver clause rate. And you see there's sort of a
mild slope, lower left, upper right, but it's hardly a very tight fit. Things are pretty
much all over the place.
We tried to look at jury trial waiver rates and the queue for trial, that is how
long you have to wait for a trial within a place, and we didn't find that very
helpful. This line is, if anything, the opposite, and Illinois is a big outlier here, and
that's Cook County in this case.
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So there are two levels of bottom line for me. One is, are corporate lawyers
focusing on jury trial waivers, or are they just overlooking this seemingly key
thing if avoiding juries were such an important things as we're often told in
reform proposals? And then I guess the other bottom line I'm sort of beginning to
take away is, the Rand data, the Bureau of Justice Statistics data, and the National
Center for State Courts data-all of which suggest for the last twenty or thirty or
forty years, no tort system in crisis-are actually quite consistent with the way
businesses are actually behaving. That is, they're not opting out of the legal
system by fleeing to arbitration. They're not opting out of jury trials by ex ante
contractually waiving them.
So, I think our businesses do know what's going on, and it suggests to me that
tort reform they regard tort reform as fine. It's like tax lobbying. We can get lower
costs if we can pay less in judgments, but it's not really born of a deep-seated fear
of either our litigation system or of our juries.
Thank you.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
Thank you, Ted. Our format is that we will ask each of our speakers to speak
for about 10 minutes, and then after that we will open it up for questions. Our
next speaker is Walter Olson.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Thank you, Dean Schizer.
My topic this morning is, is Europe "Americanizing" its legal system? And,
almost every day you see another news story suggesting that, yes, this is
happening. In England, if you turn on late-night TV you're apt to see ads with
catchy jingles promoting litigation, saying where there's blame, there's a claim.
And England and even Germany have legalized what we might call champerty;
third parties advancing money to litigants to finance their lawsuits.
France and indeed many countries in Europe are considering introducing class
actions or have already done so. Just this April, Shell oil announced a $400
million investor settlement which was ballyhooed as "the first pan-European
settlement of the securities fraud case." It was done with European investors but
organized by an American plaintiff's lead firm. Germany may be legalizing
lawyers' contingency fees. A survey by the Economist magazine found that
nearly half of executive and lawyer respondents felt that contingency fees were
on their way in, in Europe, where they had mostly been illegal.
In Canada-which I know is not actually part of Europe geographically but
which counts as part of Europe for most of these issues of legal classification-
they have already liberalized class actions and they are getting a lot more of them
in some familiar areas like employment law, where the Financial Post reports
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Canada as experiencing a boom in wage-hour, discrimination and harassment
suits--does that sound familiar?-against employers. In Ontario, there are
proposals to liberalize the awarding of punitive damages against employers.
Punitive damages have been pretty rare and pretty low in Canada up to now.
So, we've all seen the stories like this, and it is very easy to jump to the
conclusion that we have here a big, established trend which is going to go on. And
it fits, in fact, the frame of mind that many of us are approaching this with. I think,
for many conservatives in the room here, there's probably a predisposition to
believe bad news from Europe. Wouldn't you know that they would pick up on
one of our bad social trends; first to pop, and now this. How typical of modem
Europeans to take one of the social advantages they did have and toss it out the
window.
At the same time, those who would disagree with many of the underlying
premises are also predisposed that-that is, admirers of our legal system here
who believe that by and large it's just ducky.
The people in the leadership of the American Bar Association are also apt to
treat this as an unstoppable and a definite trend. If you are a leader in the ABA, for
example, you've probably been totally mystified at what these strange foreign
countries were doing for the last few centuries anyway in their legal systems.
How are you even supposed to run a legal system without contingency fees or
class actions? Why is there all this stress on making outcomes of cases uniform
and predictable? What's with that? Why are damages so low in these countries, as
almost everyone agrees that they are? What's with this "loser pays" thing? It's
almost as if they don't want you to file a suit that's going to lose. Why is the core
of judges so professionalized, so removed from politics, so removed from
ideologies, so timid in the way that they defer to legislatures as to what the law
should be? Why are they expected to be smart but not creative in these other legal
systems? And why are lawyers given so much less scope to do things like
discovery? Well, as I say, in the view of many opinion leaders in the American
legal system, this is a series of baffling questions to which the answer can only be
that these are backward systems, historical accidents, and they've never really
had a chance to think about the superiority of the American system. And once
they do think about it, they will, of course, adopt our way of doing things.
Well, I'm not going to deny that there is some genuine trend here, but I would
like to express a bit of a contrarian view and strike three themes in particular.
First, the politics of these issues are very much different abroad than they are
here, and the political influence of lawyers as an organized body of self-interest is
much less in these other countries. It is keenly felt in every one of these countries,
so far as I can see, that they do not want to end up with America's problems, and
they have no intention of giving up crucial features of their system.
I'd point out that the pressure to Americanize-we read the stories typically
from English-speaking countries, and that is where the pressure to Americanize
is, in fact, strongest. I call it the curse of the common language. Our lawyers are
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flying over there in delegations with the trial lawyers and bar associations
generally, evangelizing sometimes for the American way of litigation.
It starts in law school. A Canadian lawyer told me that they are studying law at
a Canadian school. You go to the library, and there are, of course, a few Canadian
law journals here and there, but there are row after row and stack after stack of
American law reviews, and inevitably you read them, and inevitably they come to
seem less than crazy. And this is not by and large happening so much in Asia or in
continental Europe, but it is happening in many of the English speaking
countries.
Secondly, we tend to exaggerate the extent to which Great Britain is our polar
opposite. We think, oh, well, they're totally anti-litigation, and they have entirely
different approach. From the standpoint of the most of the rest of the world this is
not so. England is viewed as more of a hybrid between the American way of
doing things and the rest of the world way, and this was true even before the
recent trends. The European Patent Office earlier this year gathered information
on the relative costs of litigation across Europe. It disclosed to litigate a small- to
medium-size cattle case in England costs between three and ten times as much as
the same case in Germany or the Netherlands. Sir Hugh Lade attributes the gap to
the English system's attachments to "lengthy cross examination and oral
argument and, above all else, disclosure of documents."
So, you had a system that was already closer to the American than many of its
rivals and has become still closer recently. In England, and indeed all of the
countries where changes have been in the offing, there has been a huge national
debate. In Britain, you have a great deal of public opinion and bench opinion
which is dead set against Americanization. You have a series of decisions by the
British judiciary upholding very eloquently principles like assumption of risk,
declining the invitation to adopt liberal American damage theories on things like
the right to sue over asymptomatic fear of future illness.
Earlier this month in the London Times there was an article by their columnist
Michael Harman about proposals to introduce class-action procedure, and
he-I'll just quote a few phrases here-he said that the perceived evils of the U.S.
model were on everyone's mind and that there was a pretty universal consensus
that in order to avoid those evils, Europe was going to keep its costs, follow the
event principles; it was going to avoid things like damage multiples, triple
damages and punitive damages.
In France, the Sarkozy government has been introducing legislation to provide
for class actions, and there was an interesting quote from a leader or a spokesman
for a leading French consumer group which was strongly in favor of introducing
class actions, but Mr. Cedric Rousseau hastened to add, "We don't want an
American law with its excesses. No contingency fees for lawyers or elected
judges and jury trials. It would be a series of brakes on abuses with professional
judges." Again, that's one of the advocates of the legislation. And I think we'll be
waiting for a long time for American consumer groups to use language like that.
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Once you turn beyond the U.K. and a few of the continental countries, you
begin to see not just a debate about whether to move in the American direction
but also some other trends. And many of you in the room here I know are familiar
with the long-standing system in effect in New Zealand, where they have
effectively national accident insurance, and they take huge numbers of personal
industry disputes completely out of the legal system in favor of social insurance.
Well, that system, many of you practicing lawyers will be glad to know, has not
spread to other countries. It remains pretty much sui generis for New Zealand.
What is showing some signs of spreading, though, is the somewhat more
moderate idea known as scheduled damages. This is very familiar to those who
have practiced in continental European systems, and it basically is the idea
behind our worker's comp, that is that they should come up with a range of
payments for particular injuries-broken arms, legs, and so forth-and apply
them not just to workplace injuries but to auto accidents and accidents in general.
A couple of years ago, Ireland-which had been, as you can imagine, very
close to the English system in the way it approached a lot of these issues-
decided on a very radical change, the sort of radical change that one seldom sees
in the tort systems. Ireland decided to adopt scheduled damages, and I will read
just a couple of sentences about what it did. "Henceforth, the compensation value
of a broken arm or leg, aside from lost wages and other economic damages, will
be determined with reference to a schedule or table known as the Quantum,
which will serve as an indicated settlement figure. The Quantum damages will
retain some flexibility to account for the details of particular injuries and injured
persons, but they are intended to be set at the same average level as the Irish
courts are currently handing out for each variety of serious injury. The difference
is that there will be no occasion, or at least less of an occasion, for dueling
attorneys to argue damages afresh in each case in hopes of getting something
higher or lower than the norm." This is tragic, of course, if you are in the business
of litigating cases. It takes away, in a great many cases, the opportunity to have
much of an argument over damages, and it just leaves you with liability.
Canada--Canada is our closest system, and it has been liberalizing, yes, and
yet the things that it is doing don't always make it into American papers.
Relatively few Americans seem to be aware that in Canada they had their tort
reform thirty years ago. According to my colleague Michael Cross from George
Mason University School of Law, who is from Qu6bec originally, he says appeals
courts revise damage awards from lower courts for uniformity, not the same
standard that American appeals courts do. In the 1970s, Canada Supreme Court
peremptorily announced it would no longer tolerate huge differences in
non-economic damages, that is pain and suffering, so it was going to put a lid on
them of $100,000. It's adjusted that for inflation, but it's still in effect.
And finally, Australia, Australia in many ways was the most American-like in
its litigation. It had very high rates of it. There was an enormous national debate,
and I believe every state in Australia enacted very strong liability rules; so strong
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that there was an enormous outcry from the legal profession because lawyers
were being laid off left and right. A whole floor of a Sydney office building was
emptied out. You could see right through it from one window to the other because
of all the layoffs of lawyers. And New South Wales Bar Association President Ian
Harrison warned that up to a third of barristers could lose their jobs. Well, what
do you think the Premier of New South Wales Bob Carr said? He said, "Tough."
The Premier gave the lawyers short thrift, saying he'd rather see money going
to workers than lining legal eagles' pockets. "Australia would have been put out
of work if we hadn't performed the tort laws and reined in the culture of litigation
in New South Wales," he said. I will close by noting that that popular premier,
Bob Carr, is an ornament of the Labor Party. Things are very different over there.
Thanks.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
Walter, thank you. Our next speaker is Victor Schwartz.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
The Dean asked if we wanted to sit or stand. But if you're 5'5", it doesn't
really make much difference.
I want to thank the Federalist Society and David Ray; they have really made
this very good. You'll see and you'll hear the professor who follows me, some of
his views will be different from my own. The Federalist Society is always
balanced with their speakers, and you'll see in this morning's paper there is a new
group--actually it started about five years ago-called the American Constitu-
tional Society. In this very place, they had me at the first meeting. So, I didn't
mind that, but outside they had this truck with very soft tomatoes and a plaintiff's
lawyer selling them. It said, "Schwartz speaks at ten." I mean, that was just a
little-the Dean and I had something in common. He was the youngest dean, I
believe, in the history of Columbia, and I was thirty-two when I was Dean at
Cincinnati, and all of the faculty were older than I am. And I learned a life's
lesson forever. To this day, I can deal with cranky people. I mean it's just a great
opportunity to be a young dean.
I'd just say off the top right in the beginning, Professor Eisenberg's works are
really great works. The data always tends to show a lot of what the tort reformers
say is not true. Some of us call it data rape.
But it tends to be that way. But we don't really-the American Tort Reform
Association, if you look at our website, actor.org, or the Institute for Legal
Reform, we've never, in years, criticized juries. That may come as a surprise to
you. Judges, yes-we do have our "Judicial Hellholes" report. We find the judges
that really are unfair. We look at the legal system, not at the juries. I did plaintiffs'
work for fourteen years. I like juries. I think there is a little bit of a problem when
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they're not given good rules or atmospheres in which to conduct objective
judgments.
This morning I'm just going to talk a little bit about the new personal injury
lawyer path to expand liability. I have an outline. If any of you are interested in
any of these trends, contact me; contact ATLA. But these are the trends that at
least I see. We study very much what the plaintiffs' lawyers are doing. I have
great respect for them. I did it. They have a terrific leader now in Jon Haber. He's
the best leader, I think, now they call it AAJ has ever had. One of the areas is to
expand the growing link between personal injury lawyers and public officials,
sometimes state attorneys general, sometimes persons in lower hierarchy in the
states, and how contingency lawyers bring cases on behalf of the public.
Some say it's a good idea. They save money. There is a contingency fee. It
doesn't come out of state coffers. Others are more concerned because some of the
delegations to these personal injury lawyers are almost complete. The Rhode
Island Paint Litigation, for example, is literally run by a plaintiffs' firm, and
plaintiffs' lawyers. I was one. Their allegiance is not necessarily to the public at
large but to expand tort law as much as possible, get as high a verdict is possible,
and that's their position. Does the delegation become just abdication of
responsibilities? We think it does. They think it doesn't. But it's certainly a trend
and it's going to expand. Whether it's guns or drugs or other things, you're going
to see more and more in the next five years, state attorney generals handing over
power to enforce their tort part to personal injury lawyers.
They are seeking, and it's been this way for a long time-nothing wrong with
it-to expand liability in the courts by changing fundamental doctrines. How
many people are lawyers here? A lot of them. Well, you know from law school
there was something called public nuisance. Actually, it's in the back of my
casebook. Most people never get to it. But it's an arcane tort, and it was used to
stop activity that was harmful to the public at large. If somebody put a big log
across Connecticut Avenue or they dumped junk in water, well, it was a good
tort-it is one-to stop that and get injunctions against it. But now, the
fundamentals of public nuisance, at least our friends in the plaintiffs' bar, are
trying to change it so it becomes a money damage vehicle to get money, not stop
activity; to expand private rights to sue; to call things nuisance that really work;
to empower state attorney generals to bring actions to recover under Medicaid for
a whole variety of things that never were before. It's a trend. It's going to expand.
We've written articles about it, but it's a vehicle for change. Is it good? We'll see
in our society.
For over twenty years there have been things called consumer protection acts. I
never really was familiar with them until about five years ago. I thought they
were public issues, and they generally are, but now they are used as private ways
to sue. And they are written so loosely that in this town-all of you know who
live here-a judge was able to prolong a case for two years seeking millions of
dollars because he left his pants at the dry cleaner, and they forgot to bring them
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back. These laws require no reliance. These laws in many states don't require that
somebody is injured, and while they say "consumer," I think they are a trend that
is inexcusable in its content.
In the United States Congress, people representing the public plaintiffs' bar are
looking for ways to expand their right to sue. Again, no problem with it, but I
would alert you to it. In the CPSC-the Consumer Product Safety Act
reauthorization in the Senate-read it and you'll see in one of the pages, guess
who's going to enforce the CPSC? Fifty-one different state attorney generals with
no supervision whatsoever-so if they decide something is defective, let's go do
it. The CPSC can intervene, but they have a very small staff and I don't think they
can monitor fifty-one state attorney generals. I think it's brilliant in terms of what
the plaintiffs' lawyers are doing.
They also, in federal legislation and state too, are trying to seed what are called
implied causes of action, and the lawyers in this room would know what they are.
It's a regulatory rule that on its face just regulates, but they formulate it in a way
so a court may later say that there is a new right to sue. Restaurants have to show
what trans fat is; if they don't, there's a penalty. But if you create a private cause
of action, somebody whose triglycerides were elevated because of these trans fats
could have a right to sue. I think there should be transparency. I think if some
legislature is going to create a new right to sue, they should say it. But that's not
really current law, and trends in that direction are right. They are seeking also to
end all preemption. That is all right, but I think when something is heavily,
heavily regulated in a proper manner, bringing a tort suit contrary to that is not
sound public policy.
Since I started teaching torts a long time ago, and we did our first edition of the
casebook in 1976, the mantra of plaintiffs' lawyers-and I said it was true and
still believe it to an extent-is the development of law should be by judges.
That's tort law. And that was always the mantra of the plaintiffs' bar. But in the
past elections a number of state legislatures have fallen under dominance of the
trial lawyers, which is okay. But they are now using the legislature at the state
level to expand rights to sue, to create brand-new rights to sue, and because law is
so arcane these things are not always understood. Wrongful death actions not for
mothers or fathers are children, but for cousins; expanding consumer protection
acts that have requirements that say you have to rely on what you've seen; a lot of
other trends, and also to undermine or change current tort reform.
A lot of tort reform does work. In Mississippi, in Texas, medical liability
reform was put in place, and insurance rates have fallen a lot. Doctor and medical
services are more available. I respect the work of Professor Eisenberg, but if you
spoke to persons in rural Mississippi who couldn't have access to medicine
because of high medical liability costs, they don't read the empirical journal.
They just know that they don't have access to medicine. Tort reforms have come
in. They've done some good. The efforts are now there to repeal them.
I just would say in conclusion that these trends are all worth looking at. They
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are a concern to me. They may be of concern to you. The plaintiffs' bar can make
very sound reasons why they think they're in the interest of democracy. I really
don't think they are, and I thank you for your time.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
Thank you, Victor. Our final speaker is Professor David Vladeck.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Good morning. I want to thank the Federalist Society for inviting me and for
bringing me together again with my good friend Vic Schwartz. Every time Vic
says he is "concerned" I feel good. It is just wonderful to listen to his litany of
"concerns" about the tort system.
I was invited, think, to be the contrarian here, so I would like to start -by
explaining why I think. this panel has been misnamed. The problem is not
overlawyering; the real question is whether underlawyering is undermining
democracy. If my view, the answer is "yes." If one looks at the trends in our legal
profession, the truth is that most Americans have no access to legal services,
cannot afford them, and this trend of under-service is accelerating, not slowing
down.6 According to the Legal Services Corporation, the American Bar
Association, and everyone else who has looked at the question, 90 percent or
more of the legal service needs of people who are not poor but are not rich are not
being met in the United States.7 That is the sobering fact.
When I went to law school, most lawyers who graduated ended up serving the
people. We ended up representing people. That's no longer the case. If one looks
at the demographic shifts in the profession, the majority of lawyers now go to
institutions that represent corporations, not individuals, and this under-service is
accelerating with cutbacks in legal services, in reductions in public funding for
legal aid, and in declining pro bono service by lawyer.8 I think the profession has
reached a point where there has been a fundamental breakdown in our ability to
provide legal services for many, many Americans.
Consider the call from Second Circuit Judge Robert Katzmann, who, along
with his Second Circuit colleagues, are facing a tidal wave of immigration cases
6. See generally David C. Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the "Unrich " in Obtaining Legal Services, in
LEGAL ETHICS: LAW STORIES 255 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, eds., 2006); David C. Vladeck, Hard
Choices: Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 KANS. J. OF LAW & PUB. POLICY 351 (2001).
7. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS: A
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2000); AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: MAJOR FINDINGS
FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 23 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, "Old and in the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal
Profession and its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wisc. L. REV. 1081; Robert L. Nelson,
The Future of American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
345 (1994).
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(as is the Ninth Circuit). Judge Katzmann recently addressed the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York to explain why the dearth of lawyers representing
immigrants was resulting in the denial of immigrants' rights. Judge Katzmann
noted that nearly two-thirds of these immigrants are unrepresented in immigra-
tion courts. 9 As a result, by the time they get to the Court of Appeals, their cases
are often hopeless. Why? When these cases go before the Court of Appeals, the
court is "largely constrained to defer to the agency's ruling," which is based on
record compiled before the agency.' ° Unrepresented immigrants cannot be
counted on to assemble a record, to present the right arguments, and to avoid
prejudicial filings. They are then caught up in a deportation nightmare that might
have been avoided. Because of the lack of legal services, immigrants often face
deportation-often with devastating consequences to their families-simply
because there are no lawyers on hand to help. So, the idea that we are suffering
from overlawyering depends on where one sits. If one sits in the corporate board
room, there is no shortage of lawyers. If one sits anywhere else, unless he or she
has a contingency fee case, he or she is going to have a difficult time getting a
lawyer.
Making this trend worse-and here, Victor and I are going to cross swords a
bit-is what I consider to be the acceleration of door-closing devices that deny
justice by keeping people out of court. Victor talked about preemption. Well, let's
talk about preemption. In the last six years, this administration, by regulatory fiat,
has announced broad preemption of liability claims for virtually every consumer
product that is regulated by the federal government." Vic wants transparency?
There has been none of that. These were not preemption decisions made as part of
a formal rulemakings. The agency simply announces, in a preamble to a final
rule, often having nothing to do with preemption, that going forward, for
example, all failure to warn claims with respect to pharmaceuticals will be
preempted, notwithstanding the fact that is no preemption provision in the Food
and Drug Act relating to pharmaceuticals and tort law and FDA regulation have
co-existed since the agency's founding.
12
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is in the midst of
rulemaking on seven different issues. In each rulemaking notice, NHTSA claims
that, "going forward, our rule will preempt state tort law." This is the largest
wholesale revision to consumer product tort law that I think has taken place since
the development of strict liability, yet it is taking place in a non-transparent way.
9. Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHmcs 3, 20 (2008).
10. Id. at 7.
11. See generally Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State
Authority?: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. (2007) (statement of David C. Vladeck).
12. See, e.g., David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Ekamination of the FDA 's Efforts to Promote
Failure to Warn Claims, 96 GEo. L. J. 461 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 227 (2007).
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And if it succeeds-we'll know that down the road when the courts start to
review these claims-we may see a wholesale revision of our tort law, not
accomplished by Congress, not fashioned by courts, but achieved through
regulatory fiat.
There are other factors as well that I think are making it more difficult for
ordinary Americans to get legal services. The data show, and Professor Eisenberg
is right, the rate of tort cases both in state and federal courts has been stable over
the last fifteen or twenty years. Now, there needs to be an asterisk next to that
statement because, during that time, the courts have been flooded with asbestos
cases, and if one controls for asbestos, that is, take asbestos cases out of the mix,
there has really been a decline in those kinds of cases even though the population
of the United States has grown by about 20 percent in that time. So, is there an
increase in tort litigation? I think the answer plainly is no. And if one controls for
asbestos litigation, then the answer is certainly no.
Let me turn to some of Professor Olson's comments because I think instead of
the Americanization of European law, what we ought to consider is the
Anglicization of the American legal system. Our legal system was founded on the
English system, but the English legal system has addressed the issue of
under-service to ordinary people in ways that the American bar ought to at least
take a look at. For example, in the United States, 90 to 95 percent of people who
go to legal services organizations with a viable claim and qualify for legal
services because they meet the very low thresholds of income eligibility are
turned away. Why? Not because they don't have a viable legal claim, they
generally do; and not because they're ineligible, they generally qualify. They are
turned away simply because legal services providers do not have the capacity to
address their needs.
In England, someone in their situation would have access to counsel; they
would go to a private lawyer, and the private lawyer would be paid for by the
state. There is virtually universal access to legal services by the poor. Now, some
people might complain that that places too great a burden on the government.
Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't. Who is to place a value on someone else's legal
claims. But at least in terms of access to justice, the English are far ahead of us.
In terms of contingency fee cases, the English have addressed the problem in a
way that may make more sense than our approach. The English have not yet
approved contingency fee cases, but it is now permitted for English lawyers to
use runners to directly solicit clients. That practice is still forbidden (at least in
theory) here. If a lawyer brazenly went up to solicit a potentially fee-paying
client, that would be a violation of the disciplinary rules, and nobody here who
practices law would do that, or at least do that in any public way. In England,
there are people with clipboards on the sidewalks signing up people for litigation.
That is the ninth circle of Hell for Victor Schwartz.
But it gives people access to the legal system. One might argue that England
still has the loser pay system, and the possibility that a plaintiff might bear the
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defendant's legal cost is a powerful deterrent against litigation. But the English
rule has been moderated to a large extent because there are now insurance
systems that permit people who think they have viable claims to go to insurers
and essentially buy insurance. This would be, of course, unethical and impossible
in the United States, but there are risk-spreading devices available elsewhere that
enable people who would otherwise be frozen out of the legal system to
participate.
Now, I'm not suggesting we adopt any of these proposals wholesale. I, too, do
not want to see people standing on the street corner with clipboards signing
people up for lawsuits. On the other hand, we have reached a point where we
need some kind of breakthrough on the provision of civil legal aid to Americans.
We need a civil Gideon. It is simply hard to imagine that we have a million
lawyers in the United States, but most Americans, unless they are fairly well off,
cannot afford basic legal services. That seems to me intolerable.
I have been told I got to wrap up. Let me just say one last word. I think that
there are all sorts of frictions in the joints in the way the American legal system
works. I think we need to have a conversation about how to improve access of
justice, how to improve quality of justice, how to make these decisions in a more
transparent way. Take preemption as an example. I agree that if Congress decides
that a heavily regulated product ought to be insulated from tort law, that is
Congress's decision to make. I do not have a problem with making that decision
in an open and transparent way, nor do I have any problem with the common law
system working the way it always has, which is letting judges and litigants fight it
out.
I am very troubled by this new trend of preemption by regulatory fiat. These
are statutes that, by and large, do not contain preemption provisions, or in the
case of the National Highway Traffic Safety Act, contain savings clauses, and the
idea that a regulatory agency can, in the face of contrary congressional direction,
simply declare that its regulatory acts are going to have a preemptive effect, I find
deeply troubling.
Thank you so much.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
I promised you a lively panel. I think we delivered on that promise, and we
would love to buy two questions. If you're near a microphone and can ask it that
way, that would be even better, so-yes?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Ted Frank. I'd like to possibly point out some agreement between Victor and
David, and that is, over the last twenty or thirty years we've seen the number of
lawyers increase, the number of corporate lawyers increase, the number of
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corporate litigators increase, their billing rates increase, and that can't be because
the number of tort cases or the volume of tort litigation is going down. It's
because it's becoming more important to have $500-an-hour lawyers, or more
expensive lawyers, looking at these cases because of the billion-dollar conse-
quences of litigation. And perhaps if there were some more constraints on that,
the amount of American resources devoted to litigation would be going down,
and there would be more access to justice because lawyers wouldn't be priced out
of the market by the need for corporations to bid for these lawyer services.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
The only point I would make is, and I would be interested in Professor
Eisenberg's view, my sense is that to the extent there've been dramatic increases
in litigation, it is corporate versus corporate litigation, not tort litigation. And so,
many of these $500 an hour lawyers are involved in very complex litigation, but
pitting one big company against the other.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
I would say, and this is not directly related to your question, Ted, but some of
the speakers were saying that the amount of litigation has remained the same.
And in my practice, I just think that that's a figure that is not really the one to
watch. In my experience in the past twenty years, the number of settlements has
grown astronomically. I mean, last week there were 65,000 cases pending against
Merck. Today, there may not be any because they were settled in a $4.5 billion
settlement. So, just to look at what actually goes to trial is not really looking at the
system as I know it. The numbers are there in litigation, but in settlements you
can't find those numbers. And more and more, I see defendants are more
interested in settling because of the cost of litigation and risks of exposure.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
That just doesn't wash. The number of tort filings is down. Trials are way
down. But the number of tort filings is down, and it's very dangerous, Victor, to
generalize from your personal experience.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
I never found it dangerous.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Let me say one word about class-action. Victor was very unhappy with class
actions, but the only pharmaceutical cases that are class actions are pharmaceuti-
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cal cases that settle. And let's not forget that it's often the defendant who wants a
class-action case because what they want to do-there's nothing wrong with
this-but they want to buy res judicata as broadly as they can, as inexpensively as
they can. And Merck obviously was very well represented; very able lawyers.
They obviously made a judgment, an economic judgment that it was going to cost
them less over time to settle, I forget how many cases it was that were wrapped up
in this class-action rather than go in the other direction. But notice that Pfizer,
which is facing the same kind of litigation with its COX-2 inhibitors, is taking a
very different approach.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
I want to hear other questions, but the Merck settlement was not a class-action
settlement. Just so everybody here knows, it's a settlement of individual cases
one by one, just so no one is confused about it.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
No, but there was the Vioxx class action that included thousands of claims,
which was settled along with everything else.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT




Yes, I have a question for Theodore Eisenberg. As I understand it, you studied
bilateral contracts by large, sophisticated commercial entities and determined
that only a low percentage of those included either jury waiver clauses or
arbitration clauses. You concluded, therefore, that the legal system can't be too
dysfunctional, at least not with respect to this kind of claim. I'm wondering,
though, since you mentioned that arbitration clauses are almost ubiquitous in
various types of consumer contracts, whether that very high instance of
arbitration clauses in those kinds of contracts suggest that in fact the legal system
is in crisis with respect to consumer contracts.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
It's hard to generalize from what we did to the consumer contracts because we
didn't study them. I'm actually doing a study now. I think you could interpret it as
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a crisis in terms of millions and millions of consumers suing their phone
companies for the one-dollar overbilling they get each month, but I think what's
pretty clearly going on with the arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is it's
simply an anti-class-action device, or more generally an anti-aggregate litigation
device because no one's going to actually sue their cell phone company over the
little ripoff they get each month if the phone company miscalculates the bill or it
systematically cheats everyone a little bit. So, what the phone companies fear and
the credit card companies fear is aggregate litigation, and the way to avoid that is
through arbitration clauses that ban class action activity. So I don't think there
was a whole swarm of suits against phone companies by individuals. It's only
class actions that they're fearful of, and that's why they put it in.
I think Merck is a really good illustration of the big question that should
trouble you whether you're conservative or liberal or whatever. If the bottom line
is plaintiffs' attorneys are doing too much and we should leave this to the
government, we really have to ask, "Where is the government with respect to
Merck and Vioxx?" This is a company that published an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine that left out three heart attacks so they could say
that there was no statistically significant increased risk of heart attack on Vioxx.
Well, the science has subsequently proven that completely wrong. Someone lied,
cheated, or stole their way into misrepresenting that data. The New England
Journal of Medicine published, in the polite phrasing of science, an "expression
of concern" about the omitted heart attacks. And where is the government?
It's true, it's not so great that the plaintiffs' lawyers may be the ones doing this,
but there are no Merck executives in jail from the Vioxx behavior. Where is the
consideration of indictments for the deaths of the people who died from the drug?
The drugs was a known killer, and it was put on the market without adequate
warning.
VICTOR SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
Hey, Ted, you like the jury system. Twelve jurors who heard all that stuff in full
context found for Merck. And I don't want do debate the Merck cases, but I think
it is-to this audience, I wouldn't look at it that way when twelve jurors who
heard all the evidence found for Merck. And I think getting into a one-sided
defamation of a company in this audience is just not a good idea.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Let me throw in, tying in with one of Professor Vladeck's, themes, the British
legal aid system examined Vioxx claims and decided that they were not viable
and it would not go forward on behalf of British patients. It turned out to be a very
accurate assessment of the weakness of litigation, as we now know, seeing that
Merck is buying its way out so cheaply from the cases.
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I'd like to throw in a remark or two also about commercial litigation because
maybe it's not a tension between Professor Vladeck's comments about how the
real litigation is business versus business and Professor Eisenberg's findings that
business isn't all that worried these days about business versus business
litigation. One way to square the circle might be that the most intense and
expensive areas of business to business litigation might be of the non-contractual
cases. It might be intellectual property. It might be antitrust or unfair competition
claims. So, maybe that's why commercial litigation is perceived as intense and
yet cannot be contracted out from.
But I would say, just from having watched things since at least as far back as
the Texaco Pennzoil case, that for quite a while people were worried. You had all
of these Texas plaintiffs' lawyers running around saying Texaco Pennzoil and the
three or four similar things that John O'Quinn did in Texas are just the start, and
before long we're going to do to commercial litigation exactly what we've done
to product liability. And that produced a panic for a few years. And then they
realized that, in fact, lawyers weren't very good at replicating that, and state
courts were not very interested in providing them with more thought.
What I take from Professor Eisenberg's very interesting study is that as a
patriotic New Yorker, I'm glad that the New York courts are considered good for
commercial contract litigation. I think that's been true for a century or so. And
you know, the more New York prays, the better. I would not, however, rush to
take comfort if I were, let's say, a doctor in New York.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
This is a question for Professor Eisenberg. I wonder if he could comment on
what may be a trend, and depending on how the U.S. Supreme Court rules in the
Hall Street case that was argued a few years ago about the provisions for
enhanced judicial review that have been occurring in arbitration contracts that
provide for arbitration but then allow for judicial review for legal error, whether
that was studied in your study and what effect that might have if the Supreme
Court says that's okay under the Federal Arbitration Act.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
I'm not as familiar with the details of the arbitration issue in the case.
Arbitration gets, I think, too much credit and too much blame for a lot.
Arbitration, at least in the employment context, may-I mean if you accept what
Mr. Vladeck said, that the average person can't get a lawyer for the average
claim, it may be that arbitration is a way in which you can get dispute resolution
at a reasonable expense, and it may actually have a role to play. Studies I've done
suggest that plaintiffs don't always lose in arbitration, that there are some fair
arbitrators out there, and that plaintiffs can win in arbitration perhaps as much as
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litigation. The problem is cost, and I'm not sure the word is in yet on whether
arbitration is actually less expensive or more expensive.
I think arbitration at its best is very good, but at its worst, you know, is just a
way of cutting off access to court because people know you'll never arbitrate.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Professor Vladeck, I had a proposal. I was kind of interested in what you think
about this. This would be a return to the free market, where if we rewind 100
years where we didn't have virtually every state requiring a three-year law degree
for entry to the bar, we had more the model of the patent bar where you could take
this exacting exam, and then you've also got the option, if you'd like higher rates,
of going and pursuing a legal education, or you could do a one-, two-, or
three-year degree.
As someone who just spent $100,000 and three years of time when I could've
been working on a law degree, you know, the idea-I can't even afford to give
someone a rate that would be considered accessible. And at the same time, the
idea that if I go do some pro bono work in criminal defense for a week or year,
that's going to be doing any kind of service to the public versus what they could
get if they could hire someone who only had to spend one year in law school, that
that's a better arrangement seems kind of ludicrous. And I'm curious about how
you would respond to that type of a system.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
I have to be very careful. My Dean is just sitting down-I cannot come out
against formal legal education.
When I went to law school, which was back at the end of the Pleistocene era,
there were many states in which you could read for the bar and take the bar, and I
know lawyers who are practicing in Washington, DC today who did that, who are
quite able lawyers. So I agree that law school as a barrier to entry is not
necessarily something that I think is necessarily a good idea. So reading for the
bar would be fine with me, as long as you pass the bar exam. I'm not sure it would
be fine with Dean Schizer.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
I enjoyed the discussion of the relative merits of the American and the
European legal systems. One subject that none.of you touched on, which I, in
over thirty years of practicing law and having had the opportunity to take some
wonderful trips to other countries, observed is that we are the only country in the
Western industrial world that does not require mandatory apprenticeships as a
condition of practicing law.
Now, law school is a wonderful thing, but I can tell you that most of the bad
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lawyering and frivolous lawsuits and the problems that create the public
perception that the problems with our profession come from young lawyers who,
you know, are heavy with student loans. They hang out a shingle. They advertise.
They don't know the first thing about how to evaluate a case, and I'd like your
comments on this because in California we're trying to start a movement to
emulate the British Inns of Court and to bring about a mandatory requirement to
emulate the medical profession, to require that more than just graduating from
law school, it should be a prerequisite to represent clients in litigation.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
The Carnegie Commission has just issued a report that I think is sending
shockwaves through law schools; because it takes pretty much the same view that
you do, that when students graduate from law school, they are not at all trained to
actually be lawyers. And so one of the proposals that the Carnegie Commission
has made is that law schools try to re-orient their curriculum to make sure that
students, before they leave, have something akin to what you are describing, that
is, some kind of structured, supervised opportunity to actually engage in the
practice of law. I think our school is taking a very hard look at trying to provide
students with those opportunities, not as clinical opportunities, but externships
and other forms of classroom-based, formal skills training. I think your views are
very much in sync with those who have taken a look at legal education. I'd be
curious to hear Dean Schizer's views on this topic.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
I think that legal education at its best is supposed to prepare people for the
practice of law-wow, a shocking assertion. And yet, there is a growing divide
between legal academy and the practice, and it's something that we really all
ought to care about, and I think it's something that we ought to address at the
nation's law schools. My own thought is that clinics are an important part of it.
Experiential learning is an important part of it. But it also gets to the way we
teach people-a slight aggression.
This panel is about litigation. I'm more of a transactional lawyer myself. I
remember my first experience as a practicing lawyer at a law firm. I was asked to
mark up a stock purchase agreement, and I said to the associate who'd had asked
me to do it, "I'd be happy to do it, but I have two questions: What's a stock
purchase agreement, and when you say mark it up, what do you mean?"
Aside from that, I was flawlessly prepared. And one of my own personal
missions as a member of our faculty at Columbia and as Dean is to try to broaden
the way we educate lawyers. I teach a class on deals, where we actually do
Socratic conversations about stock purchase agreements. I think the students
really like it, and I learn a lot from them.
20081 1455
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [
I'm not as convinced that there is sort of a one-size-fits-all answer for every
young lawyer and that it would necessarily look exactly the way you're
suggesting, but I think the spirit of what you're saying is a point well taken.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
I think there's also a tension between law schools' sort of internal reputation
among other good schools and sort of very specific hands-on training of
individual lawyers. We tend to get our prestige from, in the exaggerated phrase,
pointy-headed intellectualism that's of no relevance to anyone else, but that's a
slight exaggeration. We don't tend to get, within the law school world, prestige
from training lawyers very well. We tend to get it from academic articles-some
practical, some not-but tend to get it frbm academic articles. The actual
high-quality training of lawyers is something we are not competing on in some
deep sense. That is, our reputations don't rise or fall nearly as much on that as
they might.
But there's the cost there. I think high quality individualized training of
lawyers is expensive, and so you might have to double or triple high-quality
faculties to produce sort of no net change in the degree of good scholarship being
produced and to add the fact of very good lawyering, which I'm sorry to say may
drive up the cost of legal education because right now we're really cheap in some
sense. We're cheap for the universities because I can stand there in front of a
hundred students and train them, at least to the degree we train them. If I'm a
doctor, I have to get individual with each of them and actually teach them how to
do something, and it's very expensive.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
I think this issue ties in with the greater inclination of other countries' legal
systems to try to create peer pressure among lawyers, as well as from the bench
where lawyers feel that they're more under scrutiny by their peers. A residency
system or apprenticeship or Inns of Court, or call it what you will, will probably
increase the degree to which lawyers feel under scrutiny by their peers as well
as-you know, one good way to become an ethical lawyer is just to practice
under an ethical lawyer and see how the decisions are resolved.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
One time when I was teaching at a law school, I was teaching kids how to settle
cases. It was a small section. And another faculty-this is true-went to the Dean
and told on me, that I was hurting the reputation of the law school. So when the
Dean and spoke to me, I said, you know, he should think more broadly. I was
hurting the reputation of the law school because I was there, not just-
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DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
Yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
On your last point, the Vanderbilt University Law School is developing a
bridge between practice and academic experience as well.
A short comment and question. Professor Vladeck, if you believe that there is
not a de facto solicitation practice in the plaintiffs' personal injury bar in .the
United States, you just don't understand that industry. But my question-after
thirty years in litigation and following these subjects, I would conclude that the
broad-based tort reform initiative in this country has largely been a failure.
George Bush made that a plank in his campaign platform in 2000, as you know;
major legislation of tort reform.
However, over the last quarter-century, I think you see some rather significant
incremental reforms in litigation that mirror some of the planks of the tort reform
movement. One is the increase and move toward mediation and arbitration, and
in many jurisdictions it becomes mandatory, such as my own in Illinois. Another
is developments reflected in the Daubert decision in which there's a real concern
about junk science, which was in proliferation probably a quarter-century ago.
But now, the federal courts provide a process for limiting what expert opinion
comes in. A third is in looking at the length of litigation. The Eastern District of
Virginia here just across the river has what's called the "Rocket Docket." I think
I'm going to be a victim of that this year. Cases go to trial within nine months
after filing.
So, would you share the opinion that there have been many significant
incremental changes in the litigation system in this country that has had an impact
on this litigation explosion?
Thank you.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Well, I agree that some of those changes are important. But I do not think that
tort "reform" has failed, if one measures success as insulating business from
litigation or liability. For instance, Congress passed the General Aviation
Recovery Act to revive the general aviation industry in the U.S. Maybe that was
the right decision. Both Cessna and Piper had closed or were close to shutting
their doors. Ten years later companies are thriving; providing 20,000 or so
high-paying jobs. Congress recently passed the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA). Now, federal courts have interstate class cases; state courts have state
cases. The business community lobbied hard for CAFA So those are two
instances in which the tort reformers can claim victory. Obviously, I'm no fan of
CAFA, but for those on Victor's side of the debate, these are two successes.
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THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
I think I agree with-I'm not sure that legislative program has been quite as
successful as tort reform would hope, but I think overwhelmingly-it's hard to
measure, but I think tort reform has been a huge success for the defense over the
last twenty or twenty-five years, not so much because of individual reforms but
because of the-depending on your point of view--education or brainwashing of
America. That is, we have been told over and over again-why isn't this panel
called "Overlawyering in the Face of a Decline in Lawsuits?"-we're told over
and over again that we are in crisis, and I think people have internalized it. We
have Judicial Hellholes, by our data virgin, Victor Schwartz-we have these
labels thrown around. And so, people have really internalized it. It's really tough
to win a case, and I think tort reform has been an enormous success.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Let me just quickly add, I agree with that, that tort "reform" has had a huge
bite. And if you just look at the flat line of aggregate damage ones, if you measure
the success or failure of tort reform by payouts, I think you'd have to say tort
reform has been successful. And please be assured, I have no illusions about
solicitation in personal injury cases or in any other form of litigation. My only
point was in the United States, it is still inappropriate, at least if you read the
Code. In England, it is no-holds-barred.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
I wish we could measure the success or failure of these things better. My own
inclination is to look for data streams. We are capturing actual payouts that
include settlements rather than just things that reach verdict, which are a tiny
percentage of that, and we don't have very good data streams on most of the areas
like product liability. The numbers are about as good as anywhere on an area like
medical malpractice. And there, it doesn't quite bear out either side's case.
Payouts seem to been very fairly level in recent years after having increased
enormously twenty years ago or so.
In product liability, yes, we can get at some things like asbestos, which
continues, so far as I can see, to go up and up and up. But that doesn't mean the
pharmaceutical cases are not also producing lots of money. We just don't have as




Hi. I was just wondering, Mr. Eisenberg, you spoke about rent seeking
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behavior among corporations and kind of-
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
What kind of behavior?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Rent seeking, trying to reduce their costs by pushing tort reform. And Mr.
Schwartz, you spoke about the plaintiff's bar and opposing this in seeking to
increase their revenue. But what about the defense bar? It seems like they're
some of the most powerful organizations in the legal community, and it seems
like their incentives match up largely with the plaintiff's bar in terms of the more
work that exists, the more work they do as well. What's their role been, and you
know, what should their role be in this debate?
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
Well, first, I think you're right. I'll use the currency of anecdote. One of my
plaintiffs' lawyer acquaintances was given some trouble in the southern state by
some defense lawyers who were hassling him, and the way they punished that
defense lawyer was to drop his client from the lawsuit.
And that type of troublesome litigation behavior ceased in the next case. But I
think the defense side-well, you know, if they go by the rules of the game,
vigorously defend their clients, and in some cases they use no holds barred
litigation, I think, yes, their interests join the plaintiffs in the sense that they get
paid more in litigation. But I think some of the excess costs of litigation are in fact
because of agency problems with defense firms. There are lots of agency
problems addressed on the plaintiffs' side, but they're huge on the defense side,
and you bill by the hour, and you're not overseen closely, and there are insurance
companies paying the costs rather than the client itself. There are huge overcosts,
I think, overruns in what defense firms are paid, although it's very hard to get
inside the data.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
You've touched on one of my pet topics. I had the discussion and my last book,
The Rules Lawyers of the Defense Research Institute, which quietly but regularly
sends witnesses to testify against measures that would scale back the liability of
their own clients on the defense side. And some very fun memos came to light
during a couple of California initiative campaigns. California, as you know, has
had several runs of business trying to limit auto crash cases and others. And the
Association of Southern California Defense Counsel sent out an urgent emer-
gency memo saying we have to stop this. There's not going to be any auto defense
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business for us if this sort of thing passes. Please join with our plaintiffs' brethren
to make sure this stops. You know, it was all pretty shameless. After the memos
appeared in the newspaper, no one apologized. No one changed what they were
doing.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
One summer at Kansas City--our firm, Shook, Hardy & Bacon headquarters is
there, and the firm is litigators. We have this little public policy group that deals
with tort reform, but we're five lawyers in a 600-person firm. And a summer
associate said, Victor, isn't what you do putting the rest of the firm out of
business? I thought that was a good little question, while the chairman of the firm
was there. But to some extent, the answer is it does reduce the cost of litigation. It
does mean fewer billable hours. And I agree with Walter. In general, the defense
bar per se is not-has not-been active in civil justice reform. The spearhead has
been more the companies themselves and organizations that support and work
with those companies.
There have been exceptions, and there are defense lawyers that have worked
very hard for civil justice reform regardless of whatever individual consequence





I had a question for Professor Eisenberg. Before I ask it, I noticed that you said
median awards were flat, and you also said the tort reform had been massively
successful, so I take it that you believe that justice requires that median awards be
spiraling upwards.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
Spiraling seems like a loaded term.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
It was. My question is-the median award can hide a lot. As a former
plaintiffs' lawyer, I was very surprised by what you said. I was wondering
whether you accounted for differences in practices like med mal, or particularly
obstetrics and gynecology, employment discrimination. I was wondering whether
you accounted for differences in regions. I had always heard it was good to
1460 [Vol. 21:1433
IS OVERLAWYERING OVERTAKING DEMOCRACY?
practice in the Bronx, in North Carolina, and certain parts of the South. I was
wondering whether you had any information about, let's say, the top five percent
of awards, whether that has increased over time.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
The last I looked-I'm trying to remember. These data, there was no increase, I
believe, in the mean or median punitive damages award from the Bureau of
Justice Data on forty-five large counties from 1992 to 1996 or from 1996 to 2001.
There was just no increase. Now, I think you're completely correct to-
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT




In a particular location, I wonder if some places were better places-
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
Well, because there are so few trials and punitive awards are so rare, the data
gets so thin that you really have trouble making any sort of reasonable statistical
statements. But I think you're right. I mean, if you looking at the individual sort
of case category level such as med mal, and then even within med mal, the story
can be quite different. I think med mal has increased relative to inflation over
time. But medical costs have increased relative to inflation over time, and so you
know, you'd want an inflation index for each little industry as well as society as a
whole.
Med mal is a complicated thing. We know that most people who suffer
negligent harm by physicians never bring a claim. We know that most claims that
.are brought and that are meritless in fact do not prevail-not just most; the
overwhelming majority. And we know that the size of awards correlates with the
size of the harm. So medical mal is in some ways the most studied system
because, unlike products liability, we can get an ex post assessment of the quality
of care from the records in the case, and so there are several medical studies
where you actually look at it. It turns out most of those studies show the system
works reasonably well.
You can't stop people from filing lawsuits, and some of them will be weak. But
as the case progresses, the overwhelming evidence is that the system sort of
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works. The weak cases get filtered out. The strong cases get paid off, often not at
trial, and you have to look at the substance.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Well, let me take issue with that. We don't want to get sidetracked into it, but
still the best known of the medical malpractice empirical studies, the Harvard
one, found that a significant number of the cases considered meritless were in fact
getting payments to conclude. There was a poor association between the merits of
the case and the likelihood that it would result in litigation, and-
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
That's incorrect.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
-and nearly everyone finds the cost of payouts is heavily concentrated on a
very few specialties, and within those specialties it is. not just some small
percentage of incompetent lawyers who are being hit, but that an OB/GYN,
orthopedic surgery, and neurosurgery, you know, if you practice in the litigious
area, you are going to get sued and probably have payouts.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
I think you're right. These averages tell us absolutely nothing. There are outlier
verdicts. There are jurisdictions in the United States where forum shopping is
rampant. We do call them judicial hellholes. Nobody's ever disputed those in any
particular way. So the outlier verdict is a threat. And if you know that in a
jurisdiction-I think of a place in Mississippi, which is now much, much better,
but a few years ago ten people got, what was it, $10 million each, and their
average economic loss was $7,500. And the judge just let the plaintiffs' lawyer do
whatever he wanted. That causes fear, and that is not shown in the median
statistics.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Hi. My question is for Mr. Olson. When Professor Eisenberg put his chart of
the different jury systems and the perceived fairness up, I noticed the state of
Louisiana was very highly rated, and-
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
Well, that's a bad rating, not a good rating.
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WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Yeah. Invert them.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
Right, but you had been talking about how the systems in Europe tend to be
better. Well, Louisiana is, of course, influenced by European system and as a civil
law system. I was wondering if you could talk about why Louisiana might be
different.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Well, Louisiana, as I think people from Louisiana would be the first to tell you,
is sui generis in any number of ways. And the fact that they inherit their procedure
from the Napoleonic Code has not kept them from being a rather typical
American jurisdiction or typically liberal on many issues of damages. I don't
know enough to get into the details about how it would differ from Alabama's,
Mississippi's, Arkansas's, to which it might be compared as a cultural belt-the
Jackpot Belt, I once referred to it-along with the coastal areas of Texas, you
know, which between them have produced a vastly outsized share of controver-
sial verdicts and forum shopping issues and things like that.
Louisiana is by no means the most intense zone in that Gulf Coast belt, but it's





I'd like to put this to the whole panel. In my town, the most active PI law finns,
the back of the phone book type ones, you know, huge billboards everywhere,
they never go to trial, and very rarely, I think, ever file suit. They write demand
letters, and there's provisions in state law for instant $10,000 payments for
insurance companies. How does that get captured in your data, and isn't that the
vast majority of the transfer from the companies and insurance companies to the
plaintiffs and their lawyers?
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
I'm sorry, is this automobile or other?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
I think it applies especially-the $10,000 PIP stuff is all automobile. But I
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think just in PI work in general, at least in my town. I know that the big firms
very, very rarely go to trial or even file suit. It's all done with demand letters.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
Just in the study-I did this a long time ago, but there's a big difference
between the statement that they rarely go to trial and they rarely file suit. At least
what I looked at in products liability was you rarely got any money, any
substantial money, unless you filed suit, perhaps outside of auto. I agree, they
rarely go to trial, but I think to get serious money, you need to file suit usually.
Not always..
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ (PANELIST)
You'll get the heartland of America. The demand letter with no lawsuit, a
baseless claim, and the PI lawyer-not the top ones, not the ones who are on TV
and who I'm always debating; they never file a frivolous lawsuit-but this part of
the bar that files a case for $10,000, $7,500, and then makes an offer to settle for
what the legal costs would be for the defense. The insurers get their checks out.
They pay them. The sanctions against frivolous claims don't work because
they're rarely put in. And if this audience were the National Federation of
Independent Businesses and the 800,000 businesses that they represent, they
would have applauded you when you finished your statement because that's what
the small business of America face. They're not captured by data. They are small
claims. They're settled for just a little under the defense costs, and then their
insurance goes up. That's a home run, what he's talking about. That's real
America.
WALTER K. OLSON (PANELIST)
Employment is another area where it's very hard to look at filings and be
confident that you're capturing most of the settlements because in the employ-
ment area, typical of the a number of other ones, the plaintiffs don't want that to
be on record or to go through the trouble. They want settlement. Both sides have
an interest in keeping the filing from taking place, which does not mean there's
not going to be a settlement.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Well, with employment law you have the other problem of arbitration. I mean,
if you just look at the tableau of employment cases, you know, a huge percentage
of them never go to court because there is an arbitration agreement that would be
enforced. And so-
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DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Many, many, many employers, the large employers, now require employees to
sign arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court in a case just a few years ago
involving Wal-Mart or one of the big companies upheld the use of arbitration
clauses in employment agreements. And so you have very big companies
requiring arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.
THEODORE EISENBERG (PANELIST)
But that confirmed-the study I put up was about waiver of jury trials, but the
requirement of mandatory arbitration is much more common in the employment
contracts in the SEC database than any other contract, but those are not
representative. Those are-to be in the database, you have to be a material
contract in an accounting sense. So the contracts you'e seeing in the EDGAR
database are, you know, CEOs or people whose contracts are in some sense
material to the company. But those, far more than the other classes of contracts,
had arbitration requirements, and I think many employees see that-employment
really is different in terms of underlying, perhaps wrongful activity in a number
of lawsuits.
DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
It was. Circuit City v. Adams is the case.14
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
So with apologies to the rest of you, we have time for one more question and a
very quick answer.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT
This question is directed to Professor Vladeck. You talk about the erosion of
legal services in areas outside the corporate world. One of the potential problems
that I perceive is the possible threat of non-lawyers offering legal services in a
number of very low areas. One example might be estate planners. The other
might be accountants. Some of this encroachment is casual. Some of it is actually
very proactive, encouraged by anti-lawyer activists. Do you see this as a credible
threat to legal profession in the long haul, and if it is, what would be some of the
solutions?
14. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 523 U.S. 105 (2001).
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DAVID C. VLADECK (PANELIST)
Well, I have always had concerns about a profession that aggressively engages
in its own self-regulation. To be sure, there are unauthorized practice of law
charges filed against people who are charlatans, who are masquerading as
lawyers. Those people are criminals, and they ought to go to jail. But there are
people who provide legal services in areas in which lawyers will just not offer
services. And I'm all in favor of finding some way to certify those people to
provide targeted legal services to those who would otherwise not get it, but
subject to some regulatory overlay.
I also think that the boundaries of what constitutes the practice of law need to
be rethought. In Arizona, there is a famous dispute between the title search people
and the bar that went back and forth between the state Supreme Court and the
state legislature over the ultimate question of whether the legislature or the state
supreme court could set that boundary. I am wary of the idea that state courts of
last resort should do so-without some check, because the tendency to preserve
the lawyer monopoly is strong. There are restrictions on non-lawyers engaging in
activities that one could call legal services, but could easily be defined in some
other way, which would permit non-lawyers to fill the void that the legal
profession has not filled. I think we as a society need to grapple with, and state
legislatures need to get involved, in defining the boundaries of services that only
lawyers should provide.
After all, we should all be worried about a legal system that claims an absolute
and unconditional right to regulate itself, and at times aggressively patrols the
boundaries of what constitutes the practice of law. In most states, there is no
statute that defines what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. More often,
it is a common law rule that has evolved over years, inaccessible to anybody
without a law degree.
DAVID M. SCHIZER (MODERATOR)
We need to leave it there. And you should stay where you are because in a
moment, as soon as our panel leaves Senator Mitch McConnell will be coming in
to speak in this room, so we're actually not taking a break. But we've gotten
wonderful questions. The panel is terrific. Thank you all.
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